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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Statement of the Problem 
The proposition that fiscal policy is relatively important and 
monetary policy is impotent has been supported by many Keynesians 
(Blinder and Solow, 1974, pp. 8-11). They claim that the private 
sector is unstable and the disturbances affecting the economy arise 
from the real sector; thus governmental intervention is necessary to 
offset the fluctuations in economic activity. They therefore advocate 
discretionary fiscal policy (Modigliani, 1977, p. 2). In contrast to 
the Keynesian view, monetarists argue that the disturbances affecting 
the economy are monetary in foundation and fiscal policy is largely 
ineffective in influencing economic activity (Andersen, 1973, p. 3). 
Since the consequences of varying the rate of growth of the money 
supply cannot be predicted with great accuracy, it is extremely dif-
ficult for the authorities to use discretionary policy to fine-tune 
the economy. Thus, monetarists prefer a fixed rate of money supply 
growth rule (Mayer, 1975, p. 192). These are the terms on which the 
macroeconomic debate has been waged between the Keynesian and mone-
tarist camps. 
Recently, the main battle among the economists has shifted away 
from the Keynesian--monetarist debate; the rational expectations 
hypothesis has become the center of debate in economic theory. It 
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has led to serious questions on the validity of the Keynesian and 
monetarist doctrines; it has also emphasized limitations on the 
scope and effectiveness of stabilization policy. It has pro-
vided an alternative to evaluate the effects of different policy 
actions. According to Lucas (1981, pp. 123-126), the behavior of 
economic agents is incorporated into the structure of an econometric 
model. Their decisions are based on their expectations of the rules 
by which the authorities conduct policy. Suppose the authorities 
change their policies, agents may also be expected to change their 
decisions rationally, thereby altering the structure of the economy 
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as well. 
The importance of this theoretical innovation has stimulated 
much work testing the main implications of the rational expectations 
hypothesis. In its extreme form, one of the most striking implications 
is that only unanticipated changes in the money supply affect the real 
variables of the economy; this is sometimes called "the policy in-
effectiveness proposition" because anticipated policy actions have 
no systematic effect on the economy. 
The pioneering empirical work of Barra (1977) on the subject of 
the policy ineffectiveness proposition has offered support for the 
rational expectations hypothesis. Barra decomposes observed money 
growth into anticipated and unanticipated components. He finds that 
only unanticipated monetary changes have a significant effect on 
1sims (1982, pp. 110-121) disagrees with the Lucas critique. He 
argues that the authorities change their policy actions slowly; as a 
result, the structure of the economy does not change radically and 
rapidly. 
unemployment and real output. His work has stimulated a number of 
other economists to undertake empirical investigations into the 
relative effects of anticipated versus unanticipated money growth 
on unemployment and real output. However, the available empirical 
evidence about the policy ineffectiveness proposition is mixed. 
There is a lack of consensus between those who argue for the im-
portance of systematic monetary or fiscal policy and those who are 
against such a point of view. The following conceptual issues have 
been raised, but not satisfactorily resolved: 
a. Do anticipated monetary and fiscal changes affect real 
economic activity? 
b. Do unanticipated monetary and fiscal policy actions 
have a larger impact on real econom~c variables than 
the anticipated monetary and fiscal changes? 
c. Are Barra's results robust when the interdependence between 
monetary and fiscal policy variables is taken into account? 
Organization of the Study 
3 
This study inquires into the controversial ~ssues mentioned above. 
To that end, the study is organized as follows. Chapter II discusses 
the meaning of rational expectations. It reviews the argument of the 
policy ineffectiveness proposition. It also explains why both extra-
polative and adaptive expectations are irrational. Chapter III ex-
amines previous empirical studies on the policy ineffectiveness 
proposition. Chapter IV develops a rational expectations model. The 
theory behind the structure of the model is illustrated at that point, 
and the policy ineffectiveness proposition ~s derived. It also 
includes a discussion of the data sources. Chapter V provides 
empirical results and economic interpretation of the results. It 
also presents the estimation methods and concluding comments. The 
final chapter is a summary and conclusions of the study. 
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CHAPTER II 
STABILIZATION POLICY UNDER THE RATIONAL 
EXPECTATIONS HYPOTHESIS 
Expectations or animal spirits are a key factor of consumption, 
saving and investment, and other economic activities (Keynes, 1936, 
pp. 46-51). For example, the manner in which the authorities conduct 
their policies--how they increase expenditure, cut taxation, !issue 
more money and finance their deficits--may affect the public's ex-
pectations, which in turn may affect the future economy. 
Since expectations may play an important role in the public's 
and the authorities' decisions, it is useful at this point to exam1ne 
the role of expectations in greater depth. Extrapolative and adaptive 
expectations are employed by many economists. Generally, agents, who 
have these kinds of expectations, expect the future value of any 
economic variable in the model to be determined by a distributed 
lag of past values of the variable. First, the extrapolative expec-
tations can be illustrated in following manner (Heady and Kaldor, 1954). 
EXt b X + bl <xt - xt-1) bl > 0 (2.1) 0 t 
where EXt = the expected value of xt, 
xt = current observed value, 
bl the trend of expectation. 
The adaptive expectations hypothesis was first employed by 
Cagan (1956, pp. 27-35). His study dealt with the demand for money 
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during a period of hyperinflation. The technique was further popular-
ized by Chow (1966). The equation is 
0 < s < 1 (2.2) 
Equation (2.2) can be rewritten as 
EX = SX + (1-S) EX l t t t- (2.3) 
Equation (2.3) states that agents' adjustments are based on an 
error-learning process. Agents incorporate expectations into their 
behavior as they learn from the experience of recent events. 
The extrapolative and adaptive expectations models make sense only 
if the relationships among the past and future variables are constant. 
Lucas's critique (Lucas, 1981, pp. 123-126) of econometric models im-
plies that the structural parameters are not constant but depend on 
policy rules. When agents form expectations extrapolatively or adap-
tively, one can therefore project a policy variable in such a way 
that agents can be systematically fooled. Accordingly, the human 
learning process of adaptive or extrapolative expectations is irration-
al (Sargent and Wallace, 1973, p. 349). 
The Characteristics of Rational Expectations 
In recent years, a number of economists have advocated another 
approach to economic modelling. They suggested the rational expecta-
tions hypothesis. According to this new approach, a model is built in 
which expectations were not represented arbitrarily, but were formed 
rationally. The roots of the rational expectations school were al-
ready forming in the 1960s. Muth (1961) introduced the literal con-
cept of rational expectations. His work stimulated Lucas (1972, 1973), 
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Barra (1976), Sargent and Wallace (1975, 1976) and others to trace some 
of the implications of the rational expectations hypothesis. 
Muth's analysis (Muth, 1961) related to a variant of cobweb theory. 
He tried to illustrate the price-fixing behavior on a certain market in 
the agriculture sector. He defined the concept of rational expectations 
ln the following manner: 
In order to explain these phenomena, I should like to 
suggest that expectations, since they are informed pre-
dictions of future events, are esentially the same as 
the predictions of the relevant economic theory. At the 
risk of confusing this purely descriptive hypothesis with 
a pronouncement as to what firms ought to do, we call such 
expectations 'rational'. (Muth, 1961, p. 316). 
Rational expectationists therefore assert that economlc agents 
make economlc decisions taking into account all the available infor-
mation without cost to ensure that past mistakes would not be repeated. 
That is, agents use current and past data and the knowledge of behav-
ior to estimate the relationship among economic variables. Agents 
also update their estimation on the basis of new information. Lack 
of complete information or uncertainty may cause the agents to make 
a biased prediction, which in turn may cause real shocks in the econ-
omy (McCallum, 1980a, p. 43; Maddock and Carter, 1982, pp. 44-46). 
Monetary Policy Implications of the Rational 
Expectations Hypothesis 
With regard to the effectiveness of monetary policy, Sargent and 
Wallace (1976) present a model in which a deterministic money supply 
rule has no effect on real economic variables. That lS the fundamental 
implication of the rational expectations hypothesis, which is also a 
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basic tenet of classical monetary theory. 
Consider the Lucas supply function: 
tnY = tnY + S(tnP - E l tnPt) + e t t-1 t t- t 8 > 0 (2.4) 
where Y = real aggregate output, 
= the price level in time t, 
= the price level that is expected to prevail Ln t, 
based on t-1 available data, 
e = the random shock. 
Equation (2.4) illustrates the implications of the rational ex-
pectations hypothesis--the policy ineffectiveness proposition. This 
proposition states that if agents and the authorities have access to 
the same information and if agents have identical preferences, then 
the authorities can influence real economic variables only if they can 
change or influence the actual price level tnPt and at the same time 
not change the expected price level E 1 tnP by the same proportion. t- t 
In other words, an anticipated change of monetary growth causes .propor-
tional responses in both the actual price level and the anticipated 
price level, and thus leaves other real variables unchanged (Sargent 
and Wallace, 1976; McCallum, 1980b). 
Essentially an anticipated monetary policy LS unable to generate 
employment and production effects either Ln the short run or in the 
long run. The authorities can achieve real effects only by unantici-
pated monetary policy actions. 
This argument goes further. Woglom (1979) shows that if the au-
thorities follow a combination policy involving a combination interest 
rate and money supply rule, the inclusion of the contemporaneous 
interest rate generates instantaneous money supply changes in 
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response to economic shocks which change the rate of interest. Thus 
monetary policy parameters may influence ~eal output. Fackler 
(1982) also explains the interaction between monetary policy and the 
tax system. He assumes that labor supply decisions are based on 
after-tax real wages. For a given output, agents may be pushed into 
higher marginal tax brackets by inflation. Therefore, expans1onary 
monetary policy increases the price level and then real tax liabilities 
alter the after-tax real wage, causing the behavior of labor to 
change. Consequently, expansionary monetary policy creates short-
run employment and production effects. 
Fiscal Policy Implications of the Rational 
Expectations Hypothesis 
Surprisingly, little attention has been paid to fiscal policy. 
Sargent (1973, p. 463) considers a model with an aggregate supply 
schedule, an aggregate demand schedule, and a portfolio balance sched-
ule. He points out that the real output is independent of government 
expenditure policy. 
In a general equilibrium model with the Sargent-Wallace supply 
function, McCallum and Whitaker (1979) find that the systematic part 
of any feedback rule for monetary or fiscal policy has no effect on 
the real economic variables. However, built-in stabilizers, features 
of the tax structure that make tax liabilities respond automatically 
to current economic conditions, provide automatic but not immediate 
adjustments to reduce random disturbances and therefore have an effect 
on real economic variables. 
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Peel (1981) considers the role of both built-in stabilizers and 
systematic monetary and fiscal stabilization policy in the Sargent-
Wallace supply function and takes into account future expectations in 
the IS curve. He concludes that built-in stabilizers and systematic 
monetary and fiscal policy all have substantial impacts on real vari-
ables. 
Within a general equilibrium model, Canzoneri (1978) examines 
the random disturbances or unanticipated components of monetary and 
fiscal policy. He explains that the unanticipated components depend 
upon the Fed's regulations of the banking system, which determine 
money growth and on the political process, which determines fiscal 
policy. Unless all reserve requirements are set at 100 percent, it is 
impossible for the Fed to control total reserves completely. Commercial 
banks can still hold excess reserves, which may cause the existing ran-
domness in the money supply behavior. On the other hand, fiscal policy 
differs from one time to another depending on the history of previous 
fiscal policy actions and on past and current legislative debates. It 
is quite impossible to predict agents' spending response to fiscal 
changes in a particular year without bias. Consequently, discretionary 
monetary and fiscal policy may be at work. 
The Policy Ineffectiveness Proposition and Its Validity 
According to the literature, there are several potential channels 
through which even fully anticipated changes in monetary or fiscal 
policy actions can affect real economic variables. These are, respec-
tively, the cost of information, price-level stickiness, Fischer-Phelps-
Taylor effect, nonindexed tax system, and the Mundell-Tobin effect. 
These channels provide room for discretionary policy. 
Cost Information 
It is important to realize that the rational expectations hypo-
thesis involves expectations formed in a rational manner based on 
collecting information without cost. Actually, agents may not have 
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as much information as the rational expectations hypothesis indicates. 
Information is costly to collect. Agents may choose not to collect 
sufficient information concerning aggregate disturbances when it LS 
costly to do so (Feige and Pearce, 1976, p. 500; Cukierman, 1979, 
p. 214). If information were really free, agents would have identical 
rational expectations. When information is costly, differences in 
the cost of acquiring data cause differences Ln expectations (Darby, 
1976). Consequently, agents make choices on the basis of incomplete 
information. They are unable to distinguish between real and mone-
tary phenomena which influence nominal wage signals. This leads to 
an inflation-unemployment trade-off (Weiss, 1980). 
Even if information is readily available, economic activity may 
be affected by agents who are unable to utilize it efficiently. Thus, 
a model with rational expectations is unable to make an optimal forecast 
of the value of the economic variable concerned. (Friedman, 1979, p. 
39). Barra (1976), for example, considers an economy in which there 
are many separate markets for the same good among which information 
does not move immediately. He also provides a useful explanation of 
the implications of an information differential between the author-
ities and the agents. The authorities may have more superior informa-
tion on price expectations than the agents. Since expectations are 
formed based on restricted information, individuals cannot predict 
the actions of the authorities without bias. Hence, even systematic 
changes in policies can influence the stability of output. Howitt 
(1981), who takes into account costs of collecting and using infor-
mation and uncertainty of the structure of the economy, points out 
that it may be costly for agents to use macroeconomic information 
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even if that information is provided free of charge by the authorities. 
Taylor's (1975) analysis focuses entirely on the agents learning 
about the authorities' policy actions. He emphasizes the notions that 
agents would not have perfect information about policy actions and 
that the authorities would have more information than the agents. 
It is possible for the authorities to conduct policy actions so as 
to systematically fool the agents. Thus, deceptive policy actions 
can have systematic output effects in transition periods during which 
new information is combined with old information. Agents modify their 
expectations about the form of policy and gradually learn the rules of 
policy actions. The same conclusion is also shown by Friedman (1979). 
He points out the similarity of rational expectations to error learn-
ing during the learning process. 
Lucas (1975) develops a model in which agents face an information 
problem. They do not realize whether a change in the price of their 
labor is a real change or simply a reflection of inflation, so they 
do not know how to respond. They respond as if the price changes were 
real and not a reflection of inflation. In this case, unanticipated 
changes in the price level can generate a real effect. 
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Price-Level Stickiness 
When agents build up their information expectations rationally, 
the anticipated monetary growth rate immediately and completely causes 
a proportional 1ncrease in nominal wage and price levels, and at each 
moment of time relative prices among goods remain unchanged. There 
are no costs associated with changing prices. These assumptions are 
obviously unrealistic. In the actual economy, there are significant 
direct and indirect costs associated with changing prices, such as the 
costs of printing new price lists, the cost of making decisions about 
price changes, and the cost of renegotiating price agreements (Mussa, 
1981). Therefore, the price level is neither perfectly fixed nor 
perfectly flexible. The price level may be too sticky and adjust too 
sluggishly (Gordon, 1976). 
It is important to realize that price level stickiness does not 
contradict the idea that expectations are formed rationally. Presum-
ably, it is costly for firms to hire and fire workers. When demand 
is changing, in order to meet the new demand conditions, firms 
gradually adjust their inputs and outputs. When the expected price 
level increases due to increasing aggregate demand, the demand curve 
for workers does not shift in response to the higher price level im-
mediately, but instead gradually shifts. Thus, there exists a dis-
persion in the pr1ce changes. The stickiness of the price level 
suggests a Keynesian mechanism in which changes in the money stock lower 
the interest rate and increase investment spending, shifting up aggregate 
demand, which 1n turn affects real output. 
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Baily (1978) assumes pr1ce stickiness rather than flexibility. 
He also assumes that agents have changed the way in which expectations 
are formed rationally from observing economic development. He claims 
that these changes reflect evolving perceptions of the role of discre-
tionary fiscal policy in maintaining economic stability. Alogoskoufis 
and Pissarides (1983, pp. 618-621) argue that in a model with price 
stickiness, supply does not equal demand. Whether or not policy ineffec-
tiveness is valid depends on the source of the observed lags; if the 
sources come from the supply or demand equation, then the policy in-
effectiveness proposition is valid. If the sources come from a partial 
adjustment in price, then the policy is effective. 
The implication that price adjusts sluggishly rather than immed-
iately and therefore prevents agents from promptly responding to 
aggregate disturbances tends to deny the policy ineffectiveness propo-
sition. In a series of papers, McCallum (1978, 1980b) has argued that 
price level stickiness is not a central issue. In a rational expect-
ations model with price level stickiness, the policy ineffectiveness 
proposition still holds. 
Fischer-Phelps-Taylor Effect 
Another channel stems from the fact that contracts in the labor 
market are long and overlapping. It is not the case that wages rise 
and fall from day to day and hour to hour. Each worker does not 
negotiate a cont·ract in the same day; instead, workers enter into 
contracts that last over a period of time. 
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In short, worker contracts in existence in any particular year 
were negotiated at different dates in the past, and so the expect-
ations that are incorporated in these contracts are based on infor-
mation that is available at different dates in the past. This implies 
that the authorities can change their policy actions more frequently 
than workers can alter their contracts (Fischer, 1977; Phelps and 
Taylor, 1977; Taylor, 1980). 
The implications of long term contracting have been explored by 
Fischer (1977). He demonstrated the effectiveness of systematic policy 
actions in a model which had a labor market fix nominal wages for two 
periods in advance, rational expectations, and the Lucas aggregate 
supply function. He found that during the contracting period, the 
authorities can react to the new inflow of information about recent 
disturbances of the economic process through their policy actions, 
thus providing a stabilizing role for discretionary policy actions 
including policy actions fully· anticipated by the agents. But if 
long term contracts are indexed, anticipated policy actions may lose 
their effectiveness. 
Phelps and Taylor (1977) assume that both wage and price levels 
are fixed one period in advance and reach essentially the same con-
elusions as Fischer, who asserts that the nominal wage contracts in a 
rational expectations model have some room for discretionary monetary 
or fiscal policy during the contracting period. 
The argument mentioned above in terms of the Lucas aggregate sup-
ply function can be summarized as 
(2.5) 
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Assuming a Lucas supply function with two period labor contract, 
this becomes 
(2.6) 
Obviously, the expected price level during the second period is 
not in accordance with the information at t-1. The difference between 
tnP and E tnP therefore provides real effect for systematic mone-
t t-2 t 
tary or fiscal policy. 
Nonindexed Tax System 
Consider the real effects of anticipated monetary policy actions 
arising from the nature of a nonindexed tax system. The rational ex-
pectations hypothesis proposes that the expected rate of inflation is 
equal to the sum of the expected rate of money growth and the expected 
value of disturbance term. Since the latter is assumed to be equal to 
zero, the expected rate of inflation is equal to the expected rate of 
money growth. Anticipated changes in the money supply cause changes 
in the expected rate of inflation. Consequently; taxes are pushed in-
to higher tax brackets, which in turn reduce real output. As a re-· 
sult, the policy ineffectiveness proposition is no longer valid. 
Now consider the impact of a change in the expected rate of 
inflation on nominal and real interest rates when taxes are paid on 
interest income, depreciation deduction, and interest deduction. 
According to the United States Tax Code, capital gains are taxed 
when realized. Suppose capital gains are taxed, then the effective 
tax rate rises with the increasing rate of anticipated price level, 
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thus reducing the return on capital. Depreciation for tax purposes is 
valued at historical cost rather than replacement cost. Suppose the 
price of machines is rising; the value of the depreciation allowances 
for the same machine will be higher if the investment is proposed. Hence, 
investment in depreciable assets will become less attractive under in-
creasing anticipated price level. Nominal interest payments rather than 
real interest payment are tax deductible. Since debtors can deduct 
nominal interest payments, debt-financed investment becomes more attrac-
tive if anticipated price level increases (Feldstein and Summers, 1978; 
Feldstein, Green,and Sheshinski, 1978). 
The Fisherian conclusion is that the nominal rateof interest will be 
equal to the real rate of interest plus the anticipated rate of changes 
in the price level. The nominal rate of interest rises by the antici-
pated rate of changes in the price level and leaves the saving supply 
function and the investment demand unchanged. The nature of nonindexed 
tax system discussed above may deny the Fisherian conclusion, even when 
monetary policy actions are fully anticipated. Anticipated monetary 
policy actions tend to cause an increase in the anticipated rate of 
inflation, which in turn reduces investment and subsequent output. 
Consequently, anticipated monetary changes do have a real effect. 
Mundell-Tobin Effect 
According to Mundell (1963) and Tobin (1965), monetary policy 
has real effects by changing the distribution of returns to money 
holding. 
Mundell (1963) argues that an 1ncrease in the anticipated inflation 
rate reduces real balance holdings and therefore wealth, which causes a 
reduction in the real interest rate and an increase in real saving 
and investment. Tobin (1965) also points out that an increase in the 
anticipated rate of price level reduces the expected real rate of re-
turn from holding money as an asset, induces a portfolio shift toward 
capital, and thus increases the capital stock and real output in sub-
sequent period. 
Sargent and Wallace (1975) include capital accumulation in their 
model. Since the demand for capital depends only on the expected real 
rate of return on nominal bonds, and since the aggregate demand is un-
affected by the anticipated rate of the price level, money is neutral 
and the Fisherian proposition still holds in this model. However, 
Fischer (1979) assumes that the demand function for capital goods de-
pends not only on the expected real rate of return on capital goods 
but also positively on the anticipated inflation rate. Since anti-
cipated changes in the money supply affect the anticipated rate of 
inflation, the nonneutrality of anticipated monetary changes arises 
from the Tobin effect. Thus anticipated countercyclical policy 
actions are feasible. 
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CHAPTER III 
REVIEW OF PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
A large number of empirical studies have been carried out to test 
the policy ineffectiveness proposition. For example, Barra (1977, 
1978, 1979, 1981), Pigott (1978), Stein (1981, 1982, pp. 114-162), 
Small (1979), Sheffrin (1979), Froyen (1979), Grossman (1979), Barra 
and Hercowitz (1980), Barra and Rush (1980, pp. 23-54), Wogin (1980), 
Leiderman (1980), Attfield, Demery, and Duck (198la, 198lb), Bellante, 
Morrell, and Zardkoohi (1982), Mishkin (1982), Fitzgerald (1982), Garner 
(1982), Gordon (1982), Makin (1982), Darby (1983, pp. 273-288), Urich 
(1982), Canarella and Garston (1983), Driscoll, Ford, Mullineux, and 
Sen (1983). However, the results of these are mixed, and there exists 
presently no consensus over the hypothesis that only unanticipated 
monetary or fiscal changes have real effects. 
Only Unanticipated Monetary Changes Affect 
Real Economic Variables 
Barra (1977, 1978, 1979), Stein (1981), Sheffrin (1979), Grossman 
(1979), Barra and Hercowitz (1980), Barra and Rush (1980, pp. 23-54), 
Wogin (1980), Leiderman (1980), Attfield et al. (198la, 198lb), 
Bellante et al. (1982), Urich (1982), Canarella and Garston (1983) 
have concluded that anticipated money supply changes have no systematic 
influence on real economic variables, but that only unanticipated mone-
tary changes affect real variables. Generally, a two-stage procedure 
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is employed to test the policy ineffectiveness proposition. First, a 
forecasting equation for money growth is estimated by ordinary least 
squares over the sample period. The fitted values of the equation are 
then taken as the anticipated components of monetary or fiscal changes; 
the residuals are taken as the unanticipated components. 
Barra and others utilize annual and quarterly data gathered from 
the United States, and the Barro-type empirical investigations are 
based on the following equations: 
Money growth equation 
DM 
t a + a 1DM l + a 2DM 2 + a 3 FEDV + a 4u l + 0 t- t- t t-
wlt 
where DM = the rate of growth of annual average old Ml, 
FEDV =Log (FED) - (Log(FED))*, 
(3 .1) 
Log(FED)~ = 6(Log(FED))t + (1-6) (Log(FED))\-l 1 < 6 < 0, 
where FED is real federal government expenditure. FEDV is 
the deviation of federal government expenditure relative to 
its normal value. 
U = the annual average unemployment rate. 
The parameters a 1 through a4 are assumed to be positive; a 0 and 
w1t are the constant term and the disturbance term, respectively. 
Barra's money growth equation is designed to capture the follow-
ing aspects of the money supply process. First, the federal govern-
ment expenditure variable, FEDV, reflects the revenue motivation for 
money creation when federal government expenditure is abnormally high 
or low. Second, the lagged value of the unemployment variable is de-
signed to take into account a countercyclical relation of the monetary 
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authority. Finally, the lagged money growth variables are autoregres-
sive to describe lagged adjustment or serial dependence not captured 
by the other independent variables (Barra, 1977, p. 104). Barra and 
Rush's money growth equation is a quarterly generalization of Barra's 
annual money growth equation. Thus, the quarterly growth of money 
equation is defined as a function of six lagged values of money growth, 
three lagged values of the seasonally adjusted total unemployment, and 
a measure of current federal government expenditure (Barra and Rush, 
1980, p. 33). 
Unemployment equation 
"" 
Ut = b0+bl (DMt - DMt) + b2 (DMt-l - DMt-l)+b 3 (DMt_2 -
DM.t __ 2) +b 4MILt +b5MINWt +W2t (3.2) 
where MIL = a measurement of military conscription, 
MINW = a minimum wage, 
DM = the anticipated value of DM. 
The parameters b1 through b4 are expected to be negative, b5 is 
expected positive; b and w2 are the constant term and the error term, 0 t 
respectively (Barro, 1977, p. 107). 
Output equation 
tnYt = C0 + c1 (DMt - DMt) + c2 (DMt-l - DMt-l) + 
C3(DMt-2 - DMt-2) + C4 (DMt-3 - DMt-3) + 
C5MILt + c6t + w3t 
where Y ~ real GNP, 
t = time trend. 
(3. 3) 
The parameters cl through c6 are expected to be positive; co and 
w3t are the constant term and the error term, respectively (Barra, 
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1978, p. 553). 
Price equation 
tnPt = f 0 + tnMt- f 1tnYt + fly G/Yt + F2it-
f3t - w4t (3.4) 
where G real federal purchases of goods and services, 
> f 1>0, f 2>0, b37>, O.::_y.::_l (Barro, 1978, p. 559). 
To test the policy ineffectiveness proposition, Barro uses a two-
stage procedure, which involves the separation of total money supply 
(DM) into its anticipated and unanticipated components. He includes 
DM and unanticipated money component in his model simultaneously, then 
removes each in turn to estimate if a significant worsening of the fit 
results. For unemployment, output, and price equation, the F-statistic 
results indicate that the null hypothesis, that only unanticipated mone-
tary changes affect real economic variables, cannot be rejected by the 
data at the 5 and 1 percent significance levels. 
Grossman (1979), using quarterly data 1947-1975 for the United 
States, considered aggregate aemand as a linear function of real 
balances, international relative price level, and fiscal policy. In 
his model, monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate policies are taken as 
exogenous policy parameters. Over the sample period, he finds that 
unanticipated nominal income growth has a significant impact on 
unemployment. 
Wogin (1980) uses Canadian annual data for the period from 1927 
to 1972. A dummy variable is included for the war years 1940-1945. 
The money growth equation is specified as follows: 
DMt = e 0 + e1D + e DM + e F + e X + 2 t-1 3 t-1 4 t-1 
e5gnpt-l + e6Ut-l + W5t (3.5) 
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where F = real government expenditure, 
X the export, 
D a dummy variable, 
gnp = real GNP. 
The parameters e 1, e 2 , e 3 , and e 6 are to be positive, e4 and e5 
are to be negative; e0 and w5t are the constant term and the error 
term, respectively (Wogin, 1980, p. 61). 
The unemployment equation is defined as a function of a lagged 
value of unemployment rate, current and lagged value of anticipated and 
unanticipated changes in the logarithms of the money supply and the 
. . 
changes in the logarithms of government expenditure F and exports X 
(Wogin, 1980, p. 64), that is 
ut Yo+ ylut-1 + Y2DMt + y3DMt-l + y4(DMt- DMt) 
(3. 6) 
The parameters y 1 and y3 are to be positive, y2 , y4 , y5 , y6 , and 
y 7 are to be negative; y0 is the constant term, and w6t is the distur-
bance term. 
Recent investigation by Leiderman (1980), using annual data for 
the United States for the period 1946 to 1973, has paid attention to 
the logical independence of the rational expectations and structural 
neutrality hypotheses. He utilized Full Information Maximum Like-
hood (FIML) to test Barra's money growth and unemployment equations. 
His findings indicate that the policy inefffectiveness proposition is 
not rejected by the data at the 5 and 1 percent significance levels. 
Bellante et al. (1982) and Attfield et al. (1981a, 1981b) also employ a 
Barro-type formulation to examine the effects of unanticipated money 
growth on unemployment, output and price level for the United Kingdom. 
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Unlike the United States~ the United Kingdom is a largely open economy. 
They therefore take into account two important variables which may in-
fluence the money supply reaction function. One is the real value of 
the current public sector borrowing requirement, and the other is a 
lagged value of the balance of payments surplus. Time and a measure of 
the variability of the inflation are also taken into account in the out-
put equation. Their results are identical to Barra's. 
Stein (1982, pp. 114-162) build a general dynamic model and in-
cluded a Fischer effect in his model. He adopted Barra's measure of un-
anticipated monetary growth to test the policy ineffectiveness proposi-
tion, and his findings rejected this proposition. 
Urich (1982) establishes a model with an LM schedule. Within his 
framework, the monetary authority is assumed to maintain a target growth 
rate and uses partial adjustment to adjust the past deviation from money 
growth. A weekly unanticipated money supply announcement leads the 
agents to expect that the Fed will alter the money growth. Therefore, 
agents revise their expectations of short term interest rate which in 
turn affect real output. 
Attfield and Duck (1983) apply the method used by Attfield et al. 
(198lb) and collect data from a cross section of eighteen countries to 
test the policy ineffectiveness propostion. They conclude that this 
proposition is not rejected by the data. 
Anticipated Monetary Cahnges Affect 
Real Economic Variables 
It should be clear that a crucial problem in examining the policy 
ineffectiveness proposition lies in developing an appropriate decompo-
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sition of observed money growth into its anticipated and unanticipated 
components. Pigott (1978), Small (1979), Froyen (1979), Mishkin (1982), 
Garner (1982), Gordon (1982), Makin (1982), Darby (1983, pp. 273-288), 
Driscoll, Ford, Mullineux,and Sen (1983) have criticized Barro's origi-
nal decomposition on various grounds. 
Small (1979, p. 999) argued that only anticipated government ex-
penditure permits prior investment in tax-gathering capital; it causes 
more investment and less money creation. The following equation of his 
explains government expenditure behavior: 
(3.7) 
where FED the nominal federal government expenditure, 
GNP the nominal GNP. 
The parameters a 1, a2, and a3 are expected to be positive; a0 and 
w7t are the constant and the disturbance term, respectively. 
The residual from equation (3.7) is a measurement of unanticipated 
changes, which is called FEDUN; the money supply equation is then spe-
cified as 
DM 
t 
v + v DM l + v2DM 2 + v 3MILX1 l + v4MILX2 l + 0 1 t- t- t- t-
where MILX1 the cost of World War II, 
MILX2 = the cost of Korean and Vietnam War. 
(3.8) 
The parameters v 1 through v6 are expected to be positive; v0 and 
w8t are the constant term and the error term, respectively. 
Hence Small's money supply reaction function contains the distinc-
tion between anticipated and unanticipated fiscal policy action changes 
and the effect of the war on the money growth as well. Consequently, 
he challenges the aspects of Barro's results and rejects the policy in-
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effectiveness proposition. 
Pigott (1978) employs Barra's version to test the policy ineffec-
tiveness proposition for Japan. His findings indicate that the anti-
cipated increases in money supply stimulate real economic activity, 
especially industrial production. Anticipated decreases in money sup-
ply depress the real economic activity. 
Froyen (1979, p. 75) assumed that the Fed pursued short run stabi-
lization. Thus the money reaction function includes the unemployment 
rate, inflation rate, foreign payment balance, income, outstanding 
government debt held by the public, and full employment surplus. These 
are all lagged values. His results support the view that such antici-
pated policy actions do have real effects. Adopting Small's revision of 
government expenditure, and using a real term rather than nominal term, 
Garner (1982) finds that the results for the United Kingdom tend to sup-
port the effectiveness of systematic monetary policy actions. 
Mishkin (1982) expands Barra's analysis by distinguishing the hy-
pothesis that only unanticipated changes in the monetary policy affect 
real variables from the hypothesis that the relevant anticipations are 
rational expectations, and he tries to test these hypotheses both 
jointly and separately. Using another kind of theoretical statistical 
procedure to forecast money growth, he begins with a very different 
money supply reaction function. He utilizes a multivariate Granger 
test in order to choose the variables that best predict money growth 
and then regresses money growth on its own four lagged variables, the 
90-day Treasury bill rate, and the high employment surplus. Barra's 
variables of the current level of real government expenditures and un-
employment are omitted from the money supply equation. He finds that 
anticipated monetary policy actions do affect real output and unem-
ployment, but unanticipated movements in the money supply do not 
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have a larger impact on output than the anticipated monetary changes. 
His result is quite different and provides an ambiguous verdict on the 
rational expectations hypothesis. 
Gordon (1982) provides an alternative hypothesis, which is that 
the price level adjusts gradually in the short run and fully in the 
long run. He includes both an alternative hypothesis and the policy 
ineffectiveness proposition in a single estimating equation. His re-
sults accept the alterntive hypothesis, but reject the policy ineffect-
iveness hypothesis. Makin (1982) has pointed out that a measurement 
of inflation uncertainty should be taken into account. He assumes 
inflation uncertainty has a negative effect on output. The measure-
ment of anticipated money growth is from an ARIMA model. His findings 
also reject the policy ineffectiveness proposition. 
Darby (1983, pp. 273-288) uses data from the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Nether-
lands. Real government spending and real exports are taken into account 
in the money reaction function. The data, except for the United States, 
seem to reject the policy ineffectiveness proposition. Driscoll et a!. 
(1983) respecify a money growth equation. The only difference between 
the Driscoll model and the Barro model is that the former includes U t-2 
and MINWt. In order to test the joint hypothesis of rational expecta-
tions and structure neutrality, they employ a joint Full Information 
Maximum Likehood estimation. The data reject the rational expectations 
hypothesis. 
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Unanticipated Fiscal Changes Affect 
Real Economic Variables 
In most empirical works fiscal policy variables are included in a 
money supply reaction function as independent variables. Fiscal policy 
• 
variables affect money growth, particularly government expenditure. 
Furthermore, the empirical works do not make a clear-cut distinction 
between anticipated and unanticipated fiscal changes. 
In a rational expectations model, Hall (1978) investigates the 
effectiveness of unanticipated income tax changes. He assumes that 
the response of an income tax cut is to increase consumption, and the 
interest elasticity of the demand for money is a key factor in deter-
mining the impact of an income tax cut. Suppose the demand for money is 
interest elastic. Then real output increases more than the consump-
tion due to an increase in investment. On the other hand, suppose the 
demand for money is interest inelastic. Then the increase in consump-
tion is exactly offset by the decrease in investment, and an unantici-
pated tax cut has no impact on real output. However, empirical evi-
dence indicates that an unanticipated tax decrease has an expansionary 
impact ori output. 
Sheffrin (1979) develops a rational expectations model in which 
the price level is fixed rather than flexible. An autoregressive mov~ng 
average procedure ~s employed in order to generate unanticipated money 
growth and fiscal changes. Because firms can not distinguish between 
temporary and permanent inventory fluctuations, unanticipated monetary 
and fiscal policy action do have real effects by affecting inventories. 
In another paper, Hall (1980, pp. 7-33) indicates that public services 
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are an input for private production process. An increase in unanti-
cipated government expenditures stimulates intertemporal substitution 
of labor and production; consequently, the supply of labor increases 
and total unemployment declines; hence unanticipated government ex-
penditures can substantially alter the level of real output. 
Barro (1981) focuses on the distinction between temporary and 
permanent changes in federal government expenditure. The former cap-
tures the unanticipated components, and the latter reflects the anti-
cipated changes, which have been emphasized in earlier Barra's works. 
The empirical results suggest that temporary defense purchases have a 
significant expansionary effect on output. 
Fitzgerald (1982) examines the fiscal policy variabies, the budget 
balance,and the level of government net borrowing. He employs a multi-
variate time series approach to decompose the fiscal changes into anti-
cipated and unanticpated components. The regression results from the 
United States confirm the implication of rational expectations hypo-
thesis. Canarella and Garston (1983) utilize FIML method, and consider 
lagged unanticipated changes in the stock of debt in Barra's output 
and unemployment equations. Their results are the same as Barra's. 
Problems of Specification 
Questions to Barra's theory of the money supply process have also 
been raised. Most empirical works only estimate reduced forms rather 
than structural equations, but explain the econometric results as 
stemming from a Lucas-Sargent-Wallace type of structural model in which 
only unanticipated components have real effects (Blinder, 1980, p. 50). 
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Barre's tests contain total money (DM) and unanticipated monetary 
changes, and anticipated monetary changes having real effect are not 
included. Therefore, his tests are biased in favor of the policy in-
effectiveness proposition (Sheekey, 1984). 
The measurements of government expenditure by adaptive expectations 
seem inconsistent with the rational expectations hypothesis. The 
adaptive expectations seem reasonable and useful 1n explaining data as 
in Cagan's (1956, pp. 25-117) pioneering work on hyperinflation. How-
ever, even in Cagan's model adaptive expectations are systematically 
wrong in predicting inflation (Sargent and Wallace, 1973, p. 349). 
In Barre's framework, there exists no clear relation of monetary 
or fiscal policy actions to interest rates and the price level (Buiter, 
1983, p. 208). With respect to the interrelationship between monetary 
and fiscal policies, the money supply is influenced by government ex-
penditure rather than by taxation. Because deficits may cause interest 
rate increases, they in turn may cause inflation by rapid money growth. 
Therefore, monetary policy is strongly affected either by government 
expenditure or budget deficits (Hamburger and Zwick, 1981). The spec-
ification error problem arises if the explanatory variables do affect 
money supply but are incorrectly excluded, and vice versa. 
Monetary policy therefore should involve a broader and more com-
plex set of considerations. The previous interaction of the money 
supply process seems overly simple. It is necessary to provide a 
more realistic and more complex money supply process. 
CHAPTER IV 
A RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS MODEL OF 
POLICY EFFECTIVENESS 
This chapter contains four sections. The first discusses the 
specification of government expenditure and taxation. The second 
focuses on the money supply process in which a set of money supply 
equations is derived. The third section develops a set of rational 
expectations models, with each corresponding to different money supply 
rules, and the last describes data sources. 
Specification of Fiscal Policy Variable 
In order to establish the model, it is necessary to specify the 
government policy variables--government expenditure, taxation, and 
money supply. First to be considered are the fiscal policy variables. 
Assume that the real government expenditure is the function of the lag-
ged value of real government expenditure and a lagged value of real 
output; the former is autoregressive, and the latter represents the 
historical upward trend of government expenditure. 
which in logarithmic form is 
G £n(P ) = 
t 
Equation (4.2) can be written in terms of nominal expenditure 
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(4.1) 
(4.2) 
term. 
£nP + El t t 
where P = the price level, 
G nominal government expenditure~ 
the error term with zero mean which is serial1y 
uncorrelated. 
The coefficients g 1 and g2 are positive, and g0 is the constant 
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(4.3) 
The personal income tax and corporation income tax are two major 
revenue sources for the federal government. According to the United 
States Tax Code, corporations are allowed to carry back income over 
several years in order to adjust loss in bad years. Therefore, real 
tax revenue is assumed functionally related to the current and most re-
cently observed value of real income. 
(4. 4) 
where T = nominal tax revenue. 
In terms of logarithms, this functional relation is written as 
(4.5) 
The coefficients t 1 and t 2 are positive; t 0 and EZt are the con-
stant and the error terms, respectively. 
Specification of Monetary Policy Variable 
Money Supply Rule A 
There is no general agreement about how to formulate the policy-
maker's objective function. One way to formulate the money supply 
33 
policy rule is to derive it from the budget restraint literature. 
According to Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 791), Cagan (1965, p. 12), 
and Brunner and Meltzer (1964, p. 252), the money supply can be expres-
sed as 
M m H (4.6) t t t 
where M the money supply, 
m = the money multiplier, 
H the high-powered money. 
The government budget restraint 1s the fundamental identity that 
states the interdependence of different macroeconom1c policies. 1 This 
identity can be written as follows: 
T + 6B + 6H 
t t t 
where 6B =change in the government outstanding debt, 
6H change in the high-power~d money. 
(4. 7) 
The basis of this relationship is how to finance budget deficits. 
If government expenditure exceeds the revenue from taxation the dif-
ference must be financed in one way or another, namely, by increasing 
taxes, by increasing government debt, or by issuing high-powered money. 
The implication for the rational expectations hypothesis is as follows. 
Suppose the government budget is in deficit. Agents' expectations are 
then that in the future, either increased taxes, reduced government 
expenditures or increased money stock, i.e., taxes on real balances can 
be expected. 
1The issue of budget restraint has been discussed by Christ (1968, 
1979) and Steind1 (1971, 1974, 1977). 
The idenity (4.7) can be rearranged as 
Hence 
Ht = Gt - Tt - Bt + Bt-l + Ht-1 
Substituting (4.9) into (4.6) yields 
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(4. 8) 
(4. 9) 
(4.6)~ 
The budget restraint literature suggests that money supply move-
ments can be expressed as a function of certain variables to which the 
Fed may respond, that is 
Mt = H(Gt, Tt, Bt, Bt-l' Ht-1) 
the log-linear money supply equation (4.10) is 
~nMt = h0 + h1~nGt + h2 ~nTt + h3~nBt + h4 ~nBt-l + 
h59,nHt-l + s3t 
The coefficients hl, h3, h4, and h5 are expected 
and h2 is expected to be negative; ho is the constant 
random disturbance with zero mean. 
Money Supply Rule B 
(4 .10) 
(4.11) 
to be positive, 2 
term, s 3t is the 
The behavior of the money stock may also be considered with refer-
ence to the Fed's policy goals. The following variables, presented in a 
3 
money supply reaction function in the tradition of Barro, are relevant. 
(4 .12) 
2Government issuing more bonds means that the government is exper-
iencing a deficit (Barro, 1984, p. 374), which may cause an increase in 
the money supply through Fed's open market operations. 
3rf the influence of current target variables is excluded in react-
ion function, then the result may underestimate the effect of contempor-
aneous feedback (Blinder, 1980, pp. 51-52). 
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The pr~ce and unemployment variables reflect the Fed's policy 
goals which are to pursue high employment and pr~ce level stability 
(Blinder, 1980, PP.· 49-54). 
The log-linear form of the money supply reaction function is 
(4.13) 
The s~gns of f 1 , f 2 , f 5 , and f 6 are expected to be positive, the 
signs of f 3 and f 4 are expected to be negative; f 0 is the constant, 
and s 6t is the error term. 
Consider the unemployment variable. Assume that the unemployment 
rate ~s a function of real government expenditure and nominal tax 
revenue. 
(4.14) 
The real government expenditure and nominal tax revenue capture 
the countercyclical relation of the fiscal authority. 4 Since labor 
supply decisions are related to after-tax real wages, then decr~ased 
taxes raise the after-tax real wages and increase the labor supply 
through the income effect (Hausman, 1981, pp. 27-29). 
One can specify the functional relation (4.14) ~n logarithms as 
(4.15) 
The coefficient s 1 is expected to be negative, and s 2 is expected 
to be positive; s 0 is the constant, and s 7t is the error term. 
Substituting equation (4.15) into (4.13) an alternative monetary 
4 . 
Barro (1977, p. 10~ developed this technique. Furthermore, he 
exposited the effects of taxes on incentives, and of government expend-
itures on privafe production and consumption decisions (Barra, 1984, 
pp. 346-359). 
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policy rule is as follows: 
(4.16) 
where 
f7 = f + s 0 o' 
fs = fSsl' 
f9 = f3 - fSsl' 
flO = f5s2' 
ESt = f5E7t + E6t" 
The coefficients f 1 , f 2 , f 6 , and f 10 are positive, f 4 , f 9, and f 8 
are negative; f 7 is the constant, and ESt is the error term. 
Policy Effectiveness 
In order to derive the policy ineffectiveness proposition, a 
version of McCallum (19SOb) is used by including the fiscal policy 
variables G and T into the IS curve. 5 
b3tnTt + ~lt 
LM:tnMt = c 0 + c1tnYt + c2tnit + ~nPt + ~ 2 t 
AS:tnYt = a 0 + a1 (tnPt - Et_ 1tnPt) + a2tnYt-l + ~3 t 
The following are standard assumptions regarding 
the parameters of the IS relation: b1< 0, O<b2<1, O<b3<1; 
(4.17) 
(4.1S) 
(4.19) 
5McCallum and Whitaker (1979, p. lSO) argue that since the current 
tax system is far from indexed, it is better to use nominal term. 
the parameters of the LM relation: c2 < 0 < c1 ; 
the parameters of the AS relation: a1 > 0, 0 < a < 1. 
- 2 
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where E 1x . =mathematical expectations of X+' (j = 0,1,····) t- t+J t J 
given equations and information on all variables as of t-1, 
i = the nominal interest rate, 
the random disturbance term, which have zero 
means and constant variances. 
Rearrange equation (4.18) to get 
£ni = l (£nM - c - c1£nY - £nP - ~2 t) t c2 t o t t (4. 20) 
Substituting equation (4.20) into (4.17) eliminates i; thus 
equation (4.21) becomes 
(4.21) 
Two sub-models, with each corresponding to different money supply 
rules, can be developed from this framework. 
Model A-with Money Supply Rule A 
This model uses money supply rule A, which was discussed above. 
£nG = go + gl (£nGt-l - £nP 1) + g2£nY 1 + £nP + Elt (4. 3) t t- t- t 
£nT t + t 1£nY + t 2£nY 1 + £nP + E2t (4.5) t 0 t t- t 
£nM h + h1£nGt + h2£nTt + h3£nBt + h4£nBt-l + h5£nHt-l t 0 
+ E3t (4 .11) 
Substituting money supply rule A (4.11) and then equations (4.3), 
(4.5) into (4.21) gives 
(4.22) 
b3c2)to)' 
~ = blcl + c2- tl(blh2- b3c2)' 
1 81= ~(gl(blhl + b2c2)), 
1 82= ~((blhl + b2c2)g2 + t2(blh2 - b3c2)), 
1 
83= ~ (blhl + b2c2 + blh2- b3c2- bl), 
1 
84= ~ (-bl c2)' 
1 
85= ~ (bl h3), 
1 
86= ~ (blh4)' 
8 = 1:. (blh5), 
7 1\ 
e: = 1 ' 9t ~ (c2~lt- bl~2t + ble:3t + (blhl + b2c2)e:lt + 
(blh2- b3c2)e:2t). 
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Substituting equation (4.22) into (4.19) yields 
1 tnP = a (8 - a + 81(tnG 1 - tnP 1) + (82 - a2) t a1 - ..., 3 o o t- t-
tnYt-l + 84 Et_1(tnPt+l- tnPt) + 85tnBt + e6tnBt-l + 
(4.23) 
Take the expectation, Et-l' of equation (4.23) 
1 
(82 - a2) tnYt-l + 84Et_1 (tnPt+l- tnPt) + 
85tnBt + 86 tnBt-l + 87 tnHt-l + a1Et-l tnPt) (4.24) 
Subtracting from equation (4.23) gives 
1 
tnPt - Et-1 tnPt =a - 8 (e:9t - ~3t) 
1 3 (4.25) 
The effects of policy and shocks are given by the partial de-
rivatives of equation (4.25). 
3(~nPt - Et-l ~nPt) = b1A€lt + bD ~ O 
ah1 A2 
3(9.nPt - Et_19.nPt) = 
dh2 
(bl £2t +. tl blf.l3t)A + al tl blD ::f O 
A2 
3(9.nPt- Et-19.nPt) = (blh2- b3c2)f.l3tA 
at1 A2 
+ al(tlh2- b3c2)D ::f 0 
A2 
where A a1 ~- (b1h1 + b2c2 - b3c2 - b1), 
D = C2f.llt - blf.l2t + bl£3t + (blhl + b2c2)Elt 
+ (blh2 - b3c2)€2t - f.l3t~' 
h1 , h2 =the parameters of money supply equation (4.11), 
t 1 =the parameter of tax revenue equation (4.5). 
Putting equation (4.25) into (4.19), the reduced-form equation 
for output is 
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(4.26) 
(4.27) 
(4.28) 
(4.29) 
The expectation error, 9.nPt - E 19.nP , does depend on the policy t- t 
parameters h1 h2, andt1 • Consequently, 83 and s 9t which are functions of 
h1 , h2 , and t 1 has a systematic effect on real output. The need for 
further empirical investigation of the policy ineffectiveness proposi-
tion is suggested by the results obtained from the model A. Thus, the 
interest is whether the behavior of real output is dependent on the 
authorities' choices or random disturbance terms. 
Model B-with Money S~pply Rule B 
This model employs money supply rule B, which is summarized as 
(4.16). 
go+ gl(£nGt-l- £nPt-l) + g2£nYt-l + £nPt + Elt 
t + t 1£nY + t 2£nY 1 + £nP + E 0 t t- t 2t 
= f7 + fl£nMt-l + f2£nMt-2 + f9£nPt-l + f8£nGt + 
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(4.3) 
(4.5) 
flo£nTt + f6£nut-l + Est (4.16) 
Consider the alternative money supply rule given by (4.16). Sub-
stituting money supply rule B (4.16) and equations (4.3), (4.5) into 
(4.21) yields 
£nYt = B~ + B~(£nGt-l- £nPt-l) + B2£nYt-l + s;£nPt + B4Et-l 
(£nPt+l - £nPt) + B5£nMt-l + B6£nMt-2 + B]£nut-l + 
B~£nPt-l + E:9t 
where B~ = i~ (c 2b0 - b1c0 + b1f 7 + g0 (b1f 8 + b2c2) + t 0 
(bl flO - b3c2))' 
6~ (blcl + c2 - tl (blflO- b3c2)), 
B~ = i~(gl(blf8 + b2c2)), 
62 = i~(g2(blf8 + b2c2) + t2(blfl0- b3c2)), 
s; = i~(blf9- bl + blf8 + b2c2 + blflO- b3c2), 
64 = i~(-blc2)' 
s; = -f~cblfl), 
66 = t~<blf2), 
B] = i~(bl f6), 
B~ = i~(bl f4), 
1 
E:9t = x~<bl€8t + c2~lt- bl~2t + (blf8 + b2c2)Elt 
(4.30) 
Substitute Equation (4.30) into (4.19). This gives 
(8~ - a + B1~(£nG 1 - £nP 1) + (B~ - a2) 0 0 . t- t- . 2 
B6£nMt-2 + s; £nut-1 + 8~1nPt-l + al Et-1 
£nPt + £9t - ~3t) 
Again, employing the expectation operator on (4.31), equation 
(4.32) is 
E 1 £nP t- t 
1 (B~ - a + 81~(£nG 1 - £nP 1) + 
. 0 0 t- t-
s5~£nM 1 + s6~£nM 2 + s7~£nu 1 + s8~£nP 1 + t- . t- t- t-
a1Et_1£nPt) 
which when subtracted from equation (4.31) gives 
1 
£nPt - Et-l£nPt = a - B (E9t - ~3t) 
1 . 3 
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(4 .31) 
(4.32) 
(4.33) 
Taking the partial derivatives from equation (4.33), the effects of 
policy actions are 
3(1nPt - Et_1£nPt) = b 1U~ ~ O 
af9 A~2 
3(1nPt - Et_1£nPt)= (b1£2t + t1b 1~3t)A~ 
af10 A~2 
- (-t1b1a1-b1)D~ 
A~2 
(4.34) 
(4.35) 
~ 0 (4.36) 
a(~n~t - Et_1£nPt). 
at1 
(blflO- b3c2)~3tA~ 
A~2 
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+ a1 (b1f 10 - b3c 2 )D~ # 0 
A~2 
(4.37) 
where 
f 8 , f 9 , f 10 =the parameters of money supply equation (4.16). 
Bringing equation (4.33) into (4.19), the result of reduced-form 
output level is 
(4.38) 
Again, the expectation error, £nPt - E 1£nP , does depend on the t- t 
parameters s; and e:9t as they are the functions of the policy parameters 
f 8 , f 9 , f 10 , and t 1 • Consequently, equation (4.38) shows that the be-
havior of real output can be affected by the systematic part of mone-
tary and taxation policy actions. The need for further empirical in-
vestigation of the policy ineffectiveness proposition is suggested by 
the results obtained from the model B. Thus, the interest is whether 
the behavior of real output is dependent on the systematic part of 
monetary and fiscal policy actions or random disturbance terms. 
The output reduced-form equations (4.29) and (4.38) may be influ-
enced not only by the policy parameters of taxation and money supply 
but also by the random disturbance terms. The policy ineffectiveness 
proposition does not necessarily hold, and its existence thus is an 
empirical matter. Since the systematic part of monetary and taxation 
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policy actions could influence the behavior of real output, a more 
general output equation is given in (4.39). 
~nY = 1 + 11~nY l + A(L)AT + B(L)AM + C(L)UG + D(L) UT + t 0 t-
+ E(L)UM + E4t (4.39) 
where 
AT = anticipated taxation, 
AM anticipated money supply, 
UG unanticipated government expenditure, 
UT unanticipated taxation, 
UM unanticipated money supply, 
A(L), B(L), C(L), D(L), E(L) are lag polynominals; E4t is the random 
disturbance. 
Source of Data 
Both annual and quarterly data are used to test the policy inef-
fectiveness proposition for the United States from 1954 to 1983. The 
time period under study is significant because it is a postwar period 
which excludes the Korean War period and includes the period of redefi-
nition of monetary aggregates. 
Money supply (M) is defined as old Ml (1954-1958), new Ml (1959-
1983), seasonally adjusted. The rate of nominal interest (i) is the 
commercial paper (3-month) rate. The stock of high-powered money (H) 
is currency held by the nonbank public and commercial bank reserves. 
These are taken from Banking and Monetary Statistics 1941-1970, Annual 
Statistical Digest 1970-1979, 1980, 1981, and from various issues of the 
Federal Reserve Bulletin (Board of Governors). 
Price level (P) is the GNP implicit price deflator 1972=100. Real 
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output (Y) is real GNP in 1972 dollars. Federal government nominal ex-
penditure (G) includes government purchases and transfer payments, and 
T is federal government nominal receipts. These are obtained from 
various issues of the Survey of Current Business (U.S. Department of 
Commerce). 
The unemployment rate (U) is taken from Labor Force Statistics De-
rived from the Current Population Survey: ! Data Book, and from vari-
ous issues of the Monthly Labor Review (U.S. Department of Labor). 
The federal government outstanding debt (B) is taken from various 
issues of the Treasury Bulletin (U.S. Department of the Treasury). 
CHAPTER V 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first summarizes 
the equations to be estimated. The second discusses the technique for 
estimating unanticipated policy variables. The third section presents 
and discusses the empirical results, while the fourth develops some of 
the policy implications of the empirical results. Finally, some summary 
comments are presented. 
Statement of Equations To Be Estimated 
Following Barro (1978), the price level is derived from a demand 
for money function, that is 
~nM - ~nP = a 0 + a1~nY + a2 ~ni + ~4 t t t t - t (5 .1) 
which can be rearranged as 
~nP = ~nM - a - a ~nY - a ~ni - ~ t t 0 1 t 2 t 4t (5. 2) 
The parameter a 1 is positive, a 2 is negative; a 0 and ~4 t are the 
constant term and the error term, respectively. 
Equation (5.2) states that an increase in the money supply which is 
fully anticipated is accompanied by an equiproportionate increase in the 
price level, and there is no accompanying change in the nominal interest 
rate. The interest rate here is taken as econometrically exogenous with 
regard to monetary and fiscal policy variables (Sargent, 1976, p. 208; 
Barra, 1978, pp. 560-564; Barra and Rush, 1980, p. 27; Attfield et. al., 
45 
46 
198la, 198lb). 
From the models developed, there are two which are estimated. The 
first is model A--equations (4.3), (4.5), (4.11), (5.2), and (4.39). 
The second is model B consisting of equations (4.3), (4.5), (4.16), (5.2), 
and (4.39). The two differ only in that the first uses (4.11) and the 
other (4.16); these are two different money supply mechanisms. 
These equations are summarized as follows: 
~nG = g0 + g1 (~nG 1 - ~nP 1) + g2~nY 1 + ~nP + t t- t- t- t 
~nTt = t 0 + t 1~nYt + t2~nYt-l + ~nPt + £2t 
~nMt = h0 + h1~nGt + h2~nTt + h3~nBt + h4~nBt-l + 
h5~nHt-l + £3t 
~nMt = f 7 + f1~nMt-l + f 2~nMt_2 + f 9~nPt + f4~nPt-l + 
fs~nGt + flO~nTt + f6~nut-l + £8t 
~nPt = ~nMt - a0 - a1~nYt - a2~nit - ~4t 
~nYt = 10 + 11~nYt-l + A(L)AT + B(L)AM + C(L)UG + 
D(L)UT + E(L)UM + £4t 
Technique for Estimating 
Unanticipated Variables 
(4.3) 
(4.5) 
(4.11) 
(4.16) 
(5.2) 
(4.39) 
Three-stage least squares (3SLS) is applied to estimate the antici-
pated and unanticipated components of the policy variables. The simul-
taneous equations to be estimated are (4.3), (4.5), (4.11), and (5.2) in 
model A, and (4.3), (4.5), (4.16), and (5.2) in model B. The endogenous 
variables are G, T, M, and P. The fitted values of the endogenous vari-
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ables from the estimated model are taken as the anticipated monetary and 
fiscal components, the residuals are taken as the unanticipated monetary 
and fiscal components. For testing the policy ineffectiveness proposi-
tion, the output equation (4.39) is then estimated by ordinary least 
squares (OLS). This procedure yields consistent estimates of the model's 
parameters (Mishkin, 1982, p. 41). 
An ARIMA procedure is employed to test the serial correlation of 
output equation (4.39). If serial correlation exists, then relevant 
variables have been excluded or the functional form of output equation 
(4.39) is incorrect. Either suggests that the agents do not use all 
relevant information to form their expectations about the behavior of 
real output. 
Empirical Results 
Model A 
The model given by equations (4.3), (4.5), (4.11), and (5.2) is 
linear; three-stage least squares (3SLS) is performed on model A. This 
method takes into account all a priori restrictions inherent in the 
specification. The output equation (4.39) is estimated by ordinary 
least squares (OLS) for testing the policy ineffectiveness proposition. 
The empirical results for annual data are reported in Table I. All 
parameter estimates have the appropriate theoretical sign, with the ex-
1 
ception of Tt in equation (I.3) and AMt in equation (I.5). Since the 
relationship is linear in the logs of the variables, the coefficients 
1The coefficients of Tt and AMt are not significantly different 
from zero at the 1 percent significance level. 
TABLE I 
MODEL A EQUATION ESTIMATES 
ANNUAL: 1954 - 1983 
Government Expenditure Equation 
~nGt = -2.936 + o.647(~nGt_1 - ~nPt_1 > + o.469~nYt_1 
(-3.323}** (5.490)** (3.502)** 
+ o.996~nPt 
(19.819)** 
-2 R = 0.998 SE = 0.031 
Tax Revenue Equation 
~nTt = -6.821 
(-16.581)** 
+ o.717~nY + o.32l~nYt 1 + l.067~nP t - t 
(1.856)* (0. 786) (13.590)** 
-2 R = 0.994 SE = 0.126 
Money Supply Equation 
~nMt = 1.378 + o.l87~nGt 
(15.058)** (3.441)** 
+ o.062~nTt + 0.12s~nBt 
(1.066) (1.031) 
+ o.094~nB 1 + o.317~nH 1 t- t-
(0.776) (6.080)** 
-2 R = 0.998 SE = 0.017 
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(1.1) 
(1.2) 
(I. 3) 
TABLE I (Continued) 
Price Level Equation 
~nP = 0.852 + 1.112~nM - 0.333~nY + o.028~ni t t t t 
-2 R 
(3.137)**(25.737)** (-5.043)** (1.667) 
0.995 SE = 0.029 
Output Equation 
~nYt = -0.132 + 1.056~nYt-l - 0.009~nATt-l - 0.033~nAMt + 
-2 R 
(-0.640) (19.255)** (-1.666) (-0.964) 
0.31HnUG l t-
(3.418)** 
- 0.015~nUT l + 0.616~nUM t- t 
(-0.188) (1.980)* 
0.995 SE = 0.020 D.W. = 1.879 
** indicates significance at 1 percent level 
* indicates significance at 5 percent level 
NOTE: t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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(1.4) 
(I.5) 
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are elasticities. All equations fit the data quite well. 
The coefficients in the government expenditure equation (1.1) imply 
the elasticities of nominal government expenditure with respect to lagged 
value of real government expenditure of 0.647, with respect to lagged val-
ue of real output of 0.469, and with respect to price level of 0.996. 
These elasticities are clearly significantly different from zero at the 1 
percent level. A test of the null hypothesis that the Pt coefficient of 
0.996 is equal to unity has a t-statistic of -0.08, which is less than the 
critical value of 2.779 at the 1 percent significance level. This result 
confirms with the null hypothesis of a unit elasticity. Therefore, nominal 
government expenditures would move proportionately with the price level. 
The coefficients in the tax revenue equation (1.2) imply the elasticity 
of tax revenue with respect to current value of real output of 0.717, which 
is statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level. A test of the 
null hypothesis that the P coefficient of 1.067 is equal to unity yields a 
t 
t-statistic of 0.666, which is less than the critical value of 2.779 at the 
1 percent significance level. This result suggests that the null hypothesis 
of a unit elasticity cannot be rejected. Therefore, tax revenues would move 
proportionately with the price level. 
The coefficients in the money supply equation (1.3) have the correct 
sign except the coefficient ofT, which has the incorrect sign but is•not 
t 
significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. The coefficients 
imply elasticities of money supply with respect to government expenditure 
of 0.187 and with respect to lagged value of high-powered money of 0.317. 
Both elasticities are clearly significantly different from zero at the 1 
percent level. 
The t-statistic on interest rate is not significantly different from 
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zero at the 1 percent level in the price level equation (1.4). A test of 
the null hypothesis that the M coefficient of 1.112 is equal to unity has 
t 
at-statistic of 2.60, which is less than the critical value of 2.779 at 
the 1 percent significance level. One therefore cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of a unit elasticity. Thus, the unity coefficient on Mt indi-
cates the price level would move proportionately with the money supply. 
The test of serial correlation is the Box-Pierce test statistic, a 
chi-square test statistic (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981, pp. 548-549). 
The lags of the autocorrelation series for the annual data by an 
ARIMA procedure are reported in Table II. The calculated values of the 
Box-Pierce test for the residuals from equation (I.S) are 14.92 with 18 
degrees of freedom and 21.09 with 24 degrees of freedom. These are less 
than the critical values of 35 and 43 at the 1 percent significance level, 
respectively. Therefore, one cannot reject the hypothesis of no auto-
2 
correlation. 
2The calculated value of the D-W test for annual data is 1.879 for 
equation (1.5). This indicates no serial correlation at the 1 percent 
significance level. 
Although, of course, the presence of a lagged dependent variable 
causes the D-W test statistic to be biased to two. One, therefore, must 
employ a Durbin h test to examine the presence of serial correlation. 
That is, obtain the residual variable from the regression process and 
then generate the lagged residual variable {Judge et 1-l., 1982, pp. 456-
457). Thus the transformation for equation (I.S) is 
s 4t = -2.918 - 0.180s + 0.293tnY l - 0.545tnAT l + (-2.223)(-0.763) 4t-l (2.074) t- (-2.257) t-
0.689tnAM - 0.09HnUG l + 0.027tnUT l - 0.003tnUM 
(2.251) t (-0.941) t- (0.346) t- (-0.011) t (1.5)~ 
R.2 = o.034 SE = 0.018 
The estimate for p*, the serial correlation coefficient, is -0.180 
with at-statistic -0.763, which is less than the critical value of 
2.831 at the 1 percent level of significance. Hence the null hypothesis 
of no autocorrelation cannot be rejected at the 1 percent significance 
level. 
TABLE II 
MODEL A AUTOCORRELATION OF RESIDUALS 
ANNUAL: 1954 - 1983 
Autocorrelation of Residuals from Equation (I.5) 
To Chi 
Lag Square DF Autocorrelations 
6 5.79 6 0.059 -0.163 -0.293 -0.225 
12 8.57 12 0.130 0.075 -0.053 -0.146 
18 14.92 18 0.121 -0.062 0.069 0.067 
24 21.09 24 -0.110 -0.032 -0.035 0.133 
S.D. 0.018 
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0.009 -0.003 
-0.047 0.107 
0.101 -0.219 
-0.065 0.104 
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The quantitative results for the output equation (I.S) are reported 
in Table I. The coefficients have the correct sign, with the exception 
of AMt. Its coefficient is statistically insignificant at the 1 percent 
level. Additional lagged variables are statistically insignificant when 
incorporated in equation (I.S). The Box-Pierce test indicates absence of 
serial correlation in the residuals. Therefore, agents use all relevant 
information to form their expectations about the behavior of real output. 
The authorities cannot conduct policy actions to fool the agents systema-
tically. Furthermore, the coefficient of lagged value of the real output is 
significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. 
The t-statistic on the lagged value of unanticipated government ex-
penditures has significant explanatory power at the 1 percent level, and 
the other coefficients are not significantly different from zero at that 
level though UMt is significant at the 5 percent level. These results show 
that the anticipated monetary and fiscal policy actions have no systematic 
effect on real output; only the unanticipated fiscal and monetary components 
have significant effect on real output. Therefore, these results support 
the policy ineffectiveness proposition. The UGt-l coefficient of_0.311 
suggests that a one percent increase in unanticipated government expend-
itures increases the real output by 0.311 percent one year later. The 
UMt coefficient of 0.616 suggests that a one percent increase in unantici-
pated money supply increases the real output by 0.616 percent. 
With regard to the quarterly data, the estimated equations of model A 
by 3SLS and OLS are reported in Table III. The sign of parameters, except 
3 Tt and Bt-l in equation (III.3), are all as expected. All equations fit 
the data quite well. 
3The coefficient of B 1 is not significantly different from zero at t-the l percent level. 
TABLE III 
MODEL A EQUATION ESTIMATES 
QUARTERLY: 1954:I - 1983:IV 
Government Expenditure Equation 
~nGt = -1.038 + o.874(~nGt-l - ~nPt_1 ) + O.l61~nYt-l + 
(-3.617)** (22.625)** (3.784)** 
1. 006~nP t 
(63.355)** 
-2 R = 0.999 SE = 0.020 
Tax Revenue Equation 
~nTt = -7.120 + 0.585~nYt + 0.538~nYt-l + 1.003~nPt 
(56.036)**(2.172)* (1.980)* (41.848)** 
R.2 = o.997 SE = 0.036 
Money Supply Equation 
~nMt = 1.338 + o.o6~nGt + 0.159~nTt + 0.379~nBt -
(34.818)** (2.049)* (5.161)** (2.687)** 
0.146~nB 1 + 0.339~nH 1 t- t-
(-1.040) (14.067)** 
-2 R = 0.998 SE = 0.015 
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(III.l) 
(III.2) 
(III. 3) 
TABLE III (Continued) 
Price Level Equation 
9-nPt = 0.950 + 1.1299-nMt- 0.3629-nYt + 0.0369-nit 
(6.457)** (51.111)** (-10.255)** (4.043)** 
R.2 o.994 SE = 0.030 
Output Equation 
9-nYt = 0.005 + 1.0029-nYt-l - 0.0049-nATt + 0.0029.nAMt-l + 
(0.056) (56.211)** (-0.557) (1.063) 
0.0639-nUGt-l - 0.0759-nUTt-l + 0.0579-nUMt 
(2.202)* (-2.841)** (0.754) 
R.2 o.999 SE 0.011 D.W. 1.570 
** indicates significance at 1 percent level 
* indicates significance at 5 percent level 
NOTE: t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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(III.4) 
(III.5) 
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The coefficients in the government expenditure equation (III.l) 
suggest the elasticities of nominal government expenditure with respect 
to lagged value of real government expenditure of 0.874, with respect to 
lagged value of real output of 0.161, and with respect to price level of 
1.006. These elasticities are clearly significantly different from zero 
at the 1 percent level. A test of the null hypothesis that the Pt co-
efficient of 1.006 is equal to unity has at-statistic of 0.377, which is 
less than the ciritical value of 2.576 at the 1 percent significance level. 
This result confirms with the null hypothesis of a unit elasticity. There-
fore, nominal government expenditures would move proportionately with the 
price level. 
The coefficients in the tax revenue equation (III.2) imply the 
elasticities of tax revenue with respect to current value of real output 
of 0.585 and with respect to lagged value of real output of 0.538. Both 
elasticities are significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. 
A test of the null hypothesis that the Pt coefficient of 1.003 is equal to 
unity yields a t-statistic of 0.125, which is less than the ciritical value 
of 2.576 at the 1 percent level. This result suggests that the null hypo-
thesis of a unit elasticity cannot be rejected. Thus, tax revenues would 
move proportionately with the price level. 
The coefficients in the money supply equation (III.3) have the correct 
sign except the coefficients of T and B 1 , and the coefficient of B 1 is t t- t-
not significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. The coeffi-
cients imply the elasticity of money supply with respect to government ex-
penditure of 0.06 which is significantly different from zero at the 5 
percent level. The elasticity of money supply with respect to current value 
of bonds is 0.379, and the elasticity of money supply with respect to lagged 
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value of high-powered money is 0.339. These elasticities are all signifi-
cantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. 
The coefficients in the price level equation (111.4) suggest the 
elasticities of price level with respect to real output of -0.362 and with 
respect to interest rate of 0.036. Both .elasticit,ies are significantly 
different from zero at the 1 percent level. A test of the null hypothesis 
that the Mt coefficient of 1.129 is equal to unity has a t-statistic of 
5.84, which is greater than the critical value of 2.576 at the 1 percent 
level. One therefore cannot accept the hypothesis of a unit coefficient. 
This result indicates that the price level would not move proportionately 
with the money supply. 
The lags of the autocorrelation series for the quarterly data by an 
ARIMA procedure are reported in Table IV. 
The Box-Pierce statistics for the residuals from equation (III.S) are 
21.93 with 18 degrees of freedom and 27.40 with 24 degrees of freedom. These 
are less than the critical values of 35 and 43 at the 1 percent level of sig-
nificance, respectively. Therefore, one cannot accept the hypothesis of 
serial correlation. 4 
4According to the Durbin procedure, the transformation for output 
equation (111.5) is 
£4t = -0.786 + 0.216£4t-l- 0.102inYt-l + O.llSinATt- 0.127inAMt-l + 
(1.326) (2.273) (-1.330) (1.316) (-1.297) 
0.002inUG 1 - O.OlSinUT 1 + 0.023inUM (0.010) t- (-0.568) t- (0.305) t 
-2 R = 0.021 SE = 0.010 
(III.S)"' 
The estimate for p* is 0.216 with a t-statistic 2.273 which is less 
than the critical value of 2.576 at the 1 percent level of significance. 
Thus, there exists no serial correlation in output equation. 
TABLE IV 
MODEL A AUTOCORRELATION OF RESIDUALS 
QUARTERLY: 1954:I - 1983:IV 
Autocorrelation of Residuals from Equation (III.5) 
To Chi 
Lag Square DF Autocorrelations 
6 8.73 6 0.215 0.062 0.005 -0.018 
12 17.61 12 0.119 -0.146 -0.076 0.062 
18 21.93 18 -0.118 0.008 -0.024 -0.082 
24 27.40 24 -0.055 0.019 0.010 -0.110 
S.D. = 0.010 
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-0.116 -0.083 
0.020 -0.148 
0.095 -0.027 
-0.145 0.014 
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The quantitative results for the output equation (III.S) are reported 
in Table III. The coefficients have the correct sign. Additional lagged 
variables are statistically insignificant when incorporated in equation 
(III.S). The Box-Pierce test indicates absence of serial correlation in 
the residuals. Therefore, agents use al1 available information to form 
their expectations about the behavior of real output. The authorities 
cannot conduct policy actions to fool the agents systematically. Further-
more, the coefficient of lagged value of the real output is significantly 
different from zero at the 1 percent level. 
The t-statistics on the lagged values of unanticipated government ex-
penditures and tax revenues are significantly different from zero at the 
5 and 1 percent level, respectively,and the other coefficients are not 
significantly different from zero at that level. These results indicate 
that the anticipated monetary and fiscal policy actions have no systematic 
effect on real output; only the unanticipated fiscal components do have 
significant effect on real output. Thus, the policy ineffectiveness pro-
position still holds. The estimates coefficients in equation (III.S) also 
demonstrate the importance of the UG 1 and UT 1 • The UG 1 coefficient t- t- t-
of 0.063 suggests that a one percent increase in unanticipated government 
expenditures will increase the real output by 0.063 percent one quarter 
later. The UT 1 coefficient of -0.075 indicates that a one percent t-
increase in unanticipated tax revenues will lead to a 0.075 percent de-
crease in real output one quarter later. 
Model B 
Again, the model B given by equations (4.3), (4.5)~ (4.16), and (5.2) 
is linear; three-stage least squares (3SLS) is performed on model B. This 
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procedure takes into account all a priori.restrictions inherent in the 
specification. The output equation (4.39) is estimated by ordinary least 
squares (OLS) for testing the policy ineffectiveness proposition. The 
empirical results for annual data are reported at Table V. It is found 
that, except M .2 • P 1 , G , T , and U 1 in t- t- t t t- equation (V.3), the signs of 
5 parameters are all as expected. Since the relationship is linear in the 
logs of the variables, the coefficients are elasticities. All equations 
fit the data quite well. 
The coefficients in government expenditure equation (V.l) suggest the 
elasticities of nominal government expenditure with respect to lagged value 
of real government expenditure of 0.731, with respect to lagged value of 
real output of 0.311, and with respect to price level of 1.024. These 
elasticities are clearly significantly different from zero at the 1 per-
cent level. A test of the null hypothesis that the Pt coefficient of 1.024 
is equal to unity has a t-statistic of 0.5, which is less than the critical 
value of 2.779 at the 1 percent significance level. This result confirms 
with the null hypothesis of a unit elasticity. Thus, nominal government 
expenditures would move proportionately with the price level. 
A test of the null hypothesis that the P coefficient of 1.044 is 
t 
equal to unity in the tax revenue equation (V.2) yields a t-statistic of 
0.54, which is less than the critical value of 2.779 at the 1 percent 
significance level. This result suggests that the null hypothesis of a 
unit elasticity cannot be rejected. Thus, tax revenues would move pro-
portionately with the price level. 
5Model B is based on the assumption that the Fed pursues price level 
stability and highly employment. According to equation (V.3) the Fed does 
not fight to reduce unemployment, but to stabilize the price level. 
The coefficients of M 2 , P 1 , G , T , and U 1 are not significantly t- t- t t t-different from zero at the 1 percent level. 
TABLE V 
MODEL B EQUATION ESTIMATES 
ANNUAL: 1954 - 1983 
Government Expenditure Equation 
~nGt = -2.025 + o.731(~nGt-l - ~nPt_1 ) + o.31l~nYt_1 + 1.024~nPt 
(-2.204)* (6.126)** (3.241)** (21.506)** 
-2 R = 0.999 SE = 0.030 
Tax Revenue Equation 
~nT = -6.902 + 0.455~nYt + 0.611~nY 1 + 1.044~nP t t- t 
(-15.355)**(1.091) (1.368) (12.691)** 
-2 
'it = 0.996 SE = 0.053 
Money Supply Equation 
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(V .1) 
(V .2) 
~nMt = -0.435 + 1.857~nM 1 - 0.467~nM 2 - 1.211~nP + o.853~nP 1 t- t- t t-
(-0.914) (3.362)** (-0.742) (-1.812)* (1.733)* 
+ 0.143~nG - 0.134~nT - 0.008~nUt 1 t t -
(1.048) (-0.847) (-0.038) 
-2 R = 0.998 SE = 0.015 
Price Level Equation 
~nPt = 1.082 + 1.162~nMt- o.402~nYt + o.016~nit 
(3.359)**(26.583)** (-5.476)** (0.705) 
-2 R = 0.995 SE = 0.026 
(V. 3) 
(V.4) 
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TABLE V (Continued) 
Output Equation 
~nYt = o.052 + 1.oo2~nYt-l - o.ol2~nATt + o.oo5~nAMt-l + o.307~nuct-l 
-2 R 
(0.357) (41.053)** (-1.537) (0.895) (2.012)* 
- 0.043~nUT l + 0.243~nUM t- t 
(-0.460) (0.661) 
0.994 SE = 0.022 D.W. 1.680 
** indicates significance at 1 percent level 
* indicates significance at 5 percent level 
NOTE: t-statistics are in parentheses. 
(V.S) 
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The coefficients of M 2 , P 1 , G , T ,and U 1 in the money supply t- t- t t t-
equation (V.3) have the incorrect sign and are not significantly different 
from zero at the 1 percent level. The elasticity of money supply with 
respect to current value of price level is -1.211, which is significantly 
different from zero at the 5 percent level. The t-statistic on the lagged 
value of money supply is significantly different from zero at the 1 percent 
level. The M 1 coefficient of 1.857 suggests that a one percent increase t-
in money supply will increase the money supply by 1.867 percent one year 
later. According to the estimated coefficients, the Fed fights inflation, 
but not unemployment. 
The t-statistic on interest rate is not significantly different from 
zero in the price level equation (V.4). The elasticity of price level with 
respect to real output is 0.402, which is significantly different from zero 
at the 1 percent level. A test of the null hypothesis that the Mt coeffi-
cient of 1.162 is equal to unity has a t-statistic of 3.682, which is greater 
than the critical value of 2.779 at the 1 percent significance level. One 
therefore cannot accept the null hypothesis of a unit elasticity. This 
result indicates that price level would not move proportionately with the 
money supply. 
The ARIMA procedure also priovides no evidence to support the hypothesis 
of serial correlation. The lags of autocorrelation series for annual data 
are reported in Table VI. The Box-Pierce statistics for the residuals 
from equation (V.5) are 15.84 with 18 degrees of freedom and 22.83 with 
24 degrees of freedom. These are less than the critical values of 35 and 
43 at the 1 percent significance level, respectively. Therefore, the 
TABLE VI 
MODEL B AUTOCORRELATION OF RESIDUALS 
ANNUAL: 1954 - 1983 
Autocorrelation of Residuals from Equation (V.5) 
To Chi 
Lag Square DF Autocorrelations 
6 6.26 6 0.160 -0.114 -0.329 -0.187 
12 12.52 12 0.153 -0.050 -0.157 -0.183 
18 15.84 18 0.157 -0.078 -0.008 -0.067 
24 22.83 24 -0.085 -0.102 -0.070 0.088 
S.D. 0.020 
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-0.000 0.025 
0.053 0.212 
0.054 -0.113 
-0.019 0.143 
6 hypothesis of serial correlation cannot be accepted. 
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The quantitative results for the output equation (V.5) are reported 
in Table V. The coefficients have the correct sign. Additional lagged 
variables are statistically insignificant when incorporated in equation 
(V.5). The Box-Pierce test indicates absence of serial correlation in 
the residuals; therefore, agents use all relevant information to form 
their expectations about the behavior of real output. Since agents 
instantaneously modify their expectations about the behavior of real out-
put, the authorities cannot conduct policy actions to fool the agents 
systematically. Furthermore, the coefficient of lagged value of the real 
output is significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. 
The t-statistic on the lagged value of unanticipated government ex-
penditures is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level; the 
other coefficients are not significantly different from zero at the 1 per-
cent level. These results show that the anticipated monetary and fiscal 
policy actions do not have any systematic effect on real output; only the 
unanticipated government expenditures do have significant effect on real 
output. Therefore, these results support the policy ineffectiveness pro-
is 
6According to the Durbin procedure, the transformation for equation (V.S) 
= -0.010 + 0.148s4 l + 0.02l~nY l - 0.009~nAT (-0.211) (0.594) t- (0.221) t- (-0.241) t 
0.030~nUG l + O.OlO~nUT l + 0.013~nUM 
(0.184) t- (0.105) t- (0.033) t 
R.2 = -0.234 SE = 0.023 
- o.003~nAM 1 + (-0.046) t-
(V. 5) ... 
The estimate for p* is 0.148 with a t-statistic 0.594, which is less 
than critical value 2.831 at the 1 percent level of significance. There-
fore, the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation cannot be rejected. 
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position. The UGt-l coefficient of 0.307 suggests that a one percent in-
crease in unanticipated government expenditures will increase the real 
output by 0.307 percent one year later. 
Regarding the annual data, the results of model B share the same 
features as model A have. First, only the unanticipated monetary and fis-
cal components do have significant effect on real output. Second, the 
anticipated monetary and fiscal policy actions do not have any systematic 
effect on real output. 
With regard to the quarterly data, the results are reported in Table 
VII. The signs of parameters are all as expected, with the exception of 
Pt-l in equation (VII.3) and UMt in equation (VII.5). 7 Again, all equations 
fit the data quite well. 
The coefficients in the government expenditure equation (VII.l) imply 
the elasticities of nominal government expenditure with respect to lagged 
value of real government expenditure of 0.893, with respect to lagged value 
of real output of 0.127, and with respect to price level of 1.011. These 
elasticities are clearly significantly different from zero at the 1 percent 
level. A test of the null hypothesis that the Pt coefficient of 1.011 is 
equal to unity has at-statistic of 0.724, which is less than the critical 
value of 2.576 at the 1 percent significance level. This result confirms 
with the null hypothesis of a unit elasticity. Thus nominal government 
expenditures would move proportionately with the price level. 
The coefficients in the tax revenue equation (VII.2) imply the elas-
ticities of tax revenue with respect to lagged value of real output of 
0.788 and with respect of price level of 0.997. Both elasticities are 
7The coefficients of P 1 and UM in equation (VII.S) are not signifi-t- t 
cantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. 
TABLE VII 
MODEL B EQUATION ESTIMATES 
QUARTERLY: 1954:I - 1983:IV 
Government Expenditure Equation 
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~nGt = 0.840 + 0.893(~nGt-l- ~nPt-l) + 0.127~nYt-l + l.Oll~nPt (VII.l) 
(-2.903)**(23.194)** (2.952)** (66.650)** 
ii2 = o.999 SE = 0.019 
Tax Revenue Equation 
~nTt = 7.118 + 0.339~nYt + o.788~nYt-l + 0.997~nPt (VII.2) 
(-55.166)**(1.158) (2.674)** (41.703)** 
-2 R = 0.998 SE = 0.075 
Money Supply Equation 
~nMt = 0.205 + 0.993~nMt_1 + 0.180~nMt_2 - 2.534~nPt + 2.357~nPt_1 -
(-1.911)*(5.857)** (0.894) (-2.588)** (2.524)** 
0.033~nGt + 0.056~nTt + o.oo7~nut-l 
(-0.715) (1.027) (0.623) 
ii2 = o.997 SE = 0.011 
Price Level Equation 
~nPt = 0.974 + 1.128~nMt - 0.365~nYt + o.037~nit 
(5.781)**(49.897)** (-9.353)** (3.517)** 
ii2 = o.994 SE = 0.030 
(VII. 3) 
(VII.4) 
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TABLE VII: (Continuep) 
Output Equation 
~nYt = 0.039 + 0.994~nYt-l - 0.002~nATt-l + 0.004~nAMt + 0.040~nUGt-l 
(1.047) (155.204)** (-0.569) (1.293) (0.783) 
- 0.079~nUTt-l - 0.004~nUMt 
(-2.801)** (-0.075) 
-2 R = 0.999 SE = 0.011 D.W. = 1.542 
** indicates significance at 1 percent level 
* indicates significance at 5 percent level 
NOTE: t-statistics are in parentheses. 
(VII. 5) 
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significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. A test of the 
null hypothesis that the Pt coefficient of 0.997 is equal to unity has 
a t-statistic of -0.125, which is less than the critical value of 2.576 
at the 1 percent significance level. This result confirms with the null 
hypothesis of a unit elasticity. Thus, tax revenues would move proportion-
ately with the price level. 
The coefficients in the money supply equation (VII.3) have the correct 
sign except the coefficient of P 1 . The coefficients imply the elastici-t-
ties of money supply with respect to lagged value of money supply of 0.993 
and with respect to current value of price level of -2.534. These elas-
ticities are significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. 
According to the estimated coefficients, the Fed fights inflation, but not 
unemployment. 
The coefficients in the price level equation (VII.4) imply the elas-
ticities of price level with respect to real output of -0.365 and with 
respect ot interest rate of 0.037. Both elasticities are significantly 
different from zero at the 1 percent level. A test of the null hypothesis 
that theM coefficient of 1.128 is equal to unity has a t-statistic of 
t 
5.66, which is greater than the critical value of 2.576 at the 1 percent 
level. One therefore cannot accept the hypothesis of a unit elasticity. 
Thus, price level would not move proportionately with the money supply. 
The lags of autocorrelation series for quarterly data are reported 
in Table VIII. The Box-Pierce statistics for the residuals from equation 
(VII.5) are 21.22 with 18 degrees of freedom and 26.37 with 24 degrees of 
freedom, these are less than the critical values of 35 and 43 at the 1 
percent significance level, respectively. Thus the hypothesis of serial 
TABLE VIII 
MODEL B AUTOCORRELATIONS OF RESIDUALS 
QUARTERLY: 1954:I - 1983:IV 
Autocorrelation of Residuals from Equation (VII.5) 
To Chi 
Lag Square DF Autocorrelations 
6 9.89 6 0.229 0.045 -0.024 -0.048 
12 17.62 12 0.118 -0.131 -0.073 0.058 
18 21.22 18 -0.108 -0.027 0.002 -0.069 
24 26.37 24 -0.047 0.037 0.023 -0.104 
S.D. 0.011 
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-0.123 -0.087 
0.023 -0.136 
0.093 -0.015 
-0.138 0.025 
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correlation can be rejected. 8 
The quantitative results for the output equation (VII.S) are reported 
in Table VII. The coefficients have the correct sign. Additional lagged 
variables are statistically insignificant when incorporated in equation 
(VII.S). The Box-Pierce test indicates absence of serial correlation in 
the residuals; therefore, agents use all relevant information to form 
their expectations about the behavior of real output. Since agents instan-
taneously modify their expectations about the behavior of real output, the 
authorities cannot conduct policy actions to fool the agents systematically. 
Furthermore, the coefficient of lagged value of the real output is signi-
ficantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. 
The t-statistic on the lagged value of unanticipated tax revenue is 
significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level, and the other 
coefficients are not significantly different from zero at that level. 
These results show that the anticiapted monetary and fiscal policy actions 
do not have any systematic effect on real output; only the unanticipated 
tax revenues to have significant effect on real output. 
results confirm the policy ineffectiveness proposition. 
Therefore these 
The UT 1 coeffi-t-
cient of 0.079 suggests that a one percent increase in unanticipated tax 
8The transformation for equation (VII.S) is 
s4t = 0.004 + 0.240€4 -l - O.OOl~nY -l + 0.002~nAT -l (0.079) (2.488) t (-0.040) t (0.079) t 
0.002~nAM + 0.002~nUG l - 0.014~nUT l - 0.006~nUM 
(-0.031) t (0.032) t- (-0.513) t- (-0.103) t 
-2 R = 0.004 SE = 0.011 
(VII.S)~ 
Again, the estimate for p* is 0.240 with a t-statistic 2.488, which is 
less thanthecritica1 value of 2.576 at the 1 percent significance level. 
Hence, this equation exists no serial correlation. 
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revenues will reduce the real output by 0.079 percent one quarter later. 
Regarding the quarterly data, the results of model B and model A 
show a number of interesting features. First, the anticipated monetary 
and fiscal policy actions do not have any systematic effect on real out-
put. Second, only the unanticipated fiscal components do have significant 
effect on real output. 
Economic Interpretation 
The above-mentioned evidence supports the policy ineffectiveness 
proposition. What do these quantative results imply about the United 
States monetary and fiscal policies over the sample period 1954-1983? 
Obviously, the results can be pulled together in a general conclusion. 
Namely, the anticipated monetary and fiscal policy actions do not have 
any systematic effect on real output; only the unanticipated fiscal and 
monetary components do have significant effect on real output. The 
results therefore carry certain implications for economic policy. 
The most dramatic implication for macroeconomic policy, clearly, is 
that countercyclical monetary and fiscal policy actions are ineffective 
in reducing the United States business-cycle fluctuation. The results 
are identical to those rational expectations formulation that deny any 
systematic relationship among countercyclical monetary and fiscal policies 
and real output. Indeed, the findings for the United States are the same 
of those obtained by Barra's empirical works. 
If these results are correct, countercyclical monetary and fiscal 
policy actions cannot be implemented to reduce the fluctuations of economy. 
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Concluding Comments 
The empirical results present here are consistent with the hypothesis 
that the behavior of real output depends only on the random disturbance 
terms. The systematic parts of monetary and fiscal policy actions do not 
have any effect on real output. What are the reasons for the policy in-
effectiveness proposition? The main reasons seem to be as follows: 
a. The estimation of anticipated and unanticipated components is 
based on a full information simultaneous equations. 
b. Two different money supply mechanisms take into account the 
interactions between monetary and fiscal policies. One is 
derived from the budget restraint literature, the other from 
the Fed's stabilization policy goals. 
c. The models take into account the price level and interest rate. 
An increase in the money supply which is fully anticipated is 
accompanied by an equiproportionate increase in the price level. 
d. According to the Box-Pierce test, the output equation exhibits 
no serial correlation in the residuals, implying that agents do 
use all relevant information to form their expectations about 
the behavior of real output. Since agents instantaneously mod-
ify their expectations about the behavior of real output, the 
authorities cannot conduct policy actions to fool the agents 
systematically. 
The anticipated fiscal and monetary components were generated by an 
historical simulation process; thus, it is necessary to test the accuracy 
of simulation for both models. 
In order to test the accuracy of simulation of model A and model B, 
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the error statistics, mean absolute error (MAE), mean absolute percentage 
error (MAPE), root mean square error (RMSE), root mean square percent 
error (RMSPE), and Theil 1 s inequality coefficient are employed (Pindyck 
and Rubinfeld, 1981, pp. 360-36 7). 
The simulation error statistics of model A for annual data are re-
ported at Table IX. The statistics of MAPE show a range of MAPE errors 
from 0.178 percent for money supply to 0.667 percent for government expend-
iture. The simulated statistics of government expenditure, tax revenue, 
money supply, and price level are off 0.667 percent, 0.636 percent, 0.178 
percent, and 0.375 percent from the actual values, respectively. These 
statistics show excellent simulation results. Also, the statistics of 
Theil 1 s U show a range of Theil 1 s U from 0.001 for money supply to 0.005 
for tax revenue. The simulation statistics of Theil 1 s U for government 
expenditure, tax revenue, money supply, and price level are 0.004, 0.005, 
0.001, and 0.002, respectively. These statistics are close to zero; thus, 
the simulation results are excellent. 
The simulation error statistics of model A for quarterly data are 
reported at Table X. The statistics of MAPE show a range of MAPE errors 
from 0.190 percent for money supply to 0.629 percent for tax revenue. The 
simulated statistics of government expenditure, tax revenue, money supply, 
and price level are off 0.576 percent, 0.629 percent, 0.190 percent, and 
0.465 percent from the actual values, respectively. These statistics 
show excellent simulation results. Also, the statistics of Theil 1 s U 
show a range of Theil 1 s U from 0.001 for money supply to 0.005 for tax 
revenue. The statistics of Theil 1 s U for government expenditure, tax 
revenue, money supply, and price level are 0.004, 0.004, 0.001, and 0.003, 
respectively. These statistics are close to zero; thus, the simulation 
Endogenous 
Variable 
G 
T 
M 
p 
TABLE IX 
MODEL A SIMULATION ERROR STATISTICS 
ANNUAL: 1954 - 1983 
MAE MAPE MRSE MRSPE 
0.034 0.667% 0.045 0.920 
0.032 0.636% 0.048 0.991 
0.010 0.178% 0.013 0.234 
0.016 0.365% 0.021 0.478 
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Theil's U 
0.004 
0.005 
0.001 
0.002 
Endogenous 
Variable 
G 
T 
M 
p 
TABLE X 
MODEL A SIMULATION ERROR STATISTICS 
QUARTERLY: 1954:I - 1983:IV 
MAE MAPE MRSE MRSPE 
0.029 0.576% 0.037 0.768 
0.032 0.629% 0.042 0.840 
0.010 0.190% 0.013 0.244 
0.021 0.465% 0.025 0.579 
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Theil's U 
0.004 
0.004 
0.001 
0.003 
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results are excellent. 
The simulation error statistics of model B for annual data are re-
ported at Table XI. The statistics of MAPE show a range of MAPE errors 
from 0.206 percent for money supply to 0.656 percent for tax revenue. The 
simulated statistics of government expenditure, tax revenue, money supply, 
and price levelare off 0.503 ·percent, 0.656 percent, 0.206 percent, and 
0.212 percent from the actual values, respectively. These statistics show 
excellent simulation results. Also, the statistics of Theil's U show a 
range of Theil's U from 0.001 for money supply to 0.005 for tax revenue. The 
simulation statistics of Theil's U for government expenditure, tax revenue, 
money supply, and price level are 0.003, 0.005, 0.001, and 0.001, respectively. 
These statistics are close to zero; thus, the simulation results are ex-
cellent. 
The simulation error statistics of model B for quarterly data are 
reported at Table XII. The statistics of MAPE show a range of MAPE errors 
from 0.147 percent for price level to 0.539 percent for tax revenue. The 
simulated statistics of government expenditure, tax revenue, money supply, 
and price level are off 0.344 percent, 0.539 percent, 0.307 percent, and 
0.147 percent from the actural values, respectively. These statistics 
show excellent simulation results. Also, the statistics of Theil's U 
show a range of Theil's U from 0.001 for price level to 0.003 for tax 
revenue. The simulation statistics of Theil's U for government expend-
iture, tax revenue, money supply, and price level are 0.002, 0.003, 0.002, 
and 0.001, respectively. These statistics are close to zero; thus, the 
simulation results are excellent. 
Endogenous 
Variable 
G 
T 
M 
p 
TABLE XI 
MODEL B SIMULATION ERROR STATISTICS 
ANNUAL: 1954 - 1983 
MAE MAPE MRSE MRSPE 
0.026 0.503% 0.033 0.667 
0.034 0.656% 0.051 1.032 
0.011 0.206% 0.014 0.259 
0.010 0.212% 0.012 0.268 
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Theil's U 
0.003 
0.005 
0.001 
0.001 
Endogenous 
Variable 
G 
T 
M 
p 
TABLE XII 
MODEL B SIMULATION ERROR STATISTICS 
QUARTERLY: 1954:I - 1983:IV 
MAE MAPE MRSE MRSPE 
0.018 0.344% 0.022 0.437 
0.028 0.539% 0.037 0.707 
0.016 0.307% 0.020 0.371 
0.008 0.147% 0.008 0.181 
79 
Theil's U 
0.002 
0.003 
0.002 
0.001 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The present study focuses particularly on the issue of the policy 
ineffectiveness proposition. Since the literature on the issue of policy 
ineffectiveness is still controversial, it is of considerable interest to 
investigate this issue. Thus, the main purposes of this study are: 
a. To formulate a rational expectations model embodying the 
interdependence between monetary and fiscal policy variables 
in which the policy ineffectiveness proposition does not 
necessarily hold. 
b. To decompose monetary and fiscal policies into anticipated 
and unanticipated components in order to test the policy 
ineffectiveness proposition, and to present further empirical 
evidence on the issue. 
A theoretical model was developed to decompose monetary and fiscal 
changes into anticipated and unanticpated components. The model consisted 
of IS and LM relationships and a Sargent-Wallace supply function. From 
this basic model, two sub-models can be developed with each corresponding 
to different money supply mechanisms. Two different money supply mechan-
isms were employed. One was derived from the budget restraint literature, 
which reflected the fiscal framework of money supply mechanisms. In other 
words, an increase in the money supply responds to the government's fiscal 
operations, operations such as financing budget deficits. The other was 
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derived from the Fed's stabilization policy goals, a reaction function 
monetary mechanism. These models provided a foundation from which to 
analyze the impact of anticipated and unanticipated monetary and fiscal 
changes on real output. The models were estimated by 3SLS and OLS, using 
annual and quarterly data from the United States for the period 1954-1983. 
By examining and comparing the evidence obtained from both models, 
the following conclusions obtain. 
First, both models consist of IS and LM relationships and a Sargent-
Wallace supply function. The IS curve takes into account the fiscal policy 
variables. A money supply mechanism reflecting the fiscal framework of 
money supply is incorporated in model A. The Fed's reaction function mone-
tary mechanism is incorporated in model B. Both models are general equil-
ibrium models with each corresponding to different money supply mechanisms. 
The expectation error obtained from each model implies that the policy 
ineffectiveness proposition does not necessarily hold. That is, each 
model is structured so that the effectiveness of policy question is an 
empirical one. The behavior of real output may be dependent not only on 
the systematic influence of authorities' choices but also on the random 
disburance terms. The authorities could thus conduct policy actions to 
fool the agents systematically. 
Second, the most important finding is that for each model for both 
annual and quarterly data, the empirical estimates indicate that antici-
pated monetary and fiscal policy actions do not have any systematic effect 
on real output. Thus, the policy ineffectiveness proposition is valid. 
Third, the empirical results further indicate that agents instantan-
eously modify their expectations about the behavior of real output; the 
authorities cannot conduct policy actions to fool the agents systematically. 
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The results confirm that only unanticipated fiscal and monetary components 
have significant effects on real output in both models. In all the re-
gression results, the unanticipated fiscal components have a significant 
effect on real output. In some models, it is unanticipated government 
expenditures that are significant; in the others, it is unanticipated tax 
revenues. Unanticipated money supply changes are significant in only one 
model-- model A with annual data. The models are not sufficiently robust, 
though, to address the issues of whether unanticipated fiscal variables 
are more important, in some sense, than the unanticipated monetary variable. 
What the results do show, however, is that anticipated fiscal and monetary 
policy variables have not discernible systematic influence. Thus, counter-
cyclical monetary and fiscal policy actions play no role in stabilizing 
the fluctuation of economy. 
Finally, with regard to testing the policy ineffectiveness proposition, 
both models performed quite well empirically, with both annual and quarterly 
data. 
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